all nations was exactly like free trade in and services and free capital mobility: their goods and services, a mutual-gain interfering with either will produce phenomenon. Hence restricted capital efficiency losses. But only an untutored mobility, just like protectionism, was seen economist will argue that, therefore, free to be harmful to economic performance in trade in widgets and life insurance policies each country, whether rich or poor. That is the same as free capital mobility. Capital the gains might be problematic because of the cost of crises was not considered.
However, the Asian crisis cannot be separated from the excessive borrowings of foreign short-term capital as Asian economies loosened up their capital account controls and enabled their banks and firms to borrow abroad. In 1996, total private capital inflows to Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines were $93 billion, up from $41 billion in 1994. In 1997, that suddenly changed to an outflow of $12 billion. Hence it has become apparent that crises attendant on capital mobility cannot be ignored.
Although it is conceded that this downside exists, many claim that it can be ameliorated, if not eliminated, and that free capital mobility's immense advantages flows are characterized, as the economic historian Charles Kindleberger ofthe Massachusetts Institute of Technology has famously noted, by panics and manias.
Each time a crisis related to capital inflows hits a country, it typically goes through the wringer. The debt crisis of the 1980s cost South America a decade of growth. The Mexicans, who were vastly overexposed through short-term inflows, were devastated in 1994. The Asian economies of Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea, all heavily burdened with short-term debt, went into a tailspin nearly a year ago, drastically lowering their growth rates. Sure enough, serious economic downturns and crises can arise even when govemments are not particularly vulnerable due to short-term borrowing: macroecocan be enjoyed by all. Conservatives would nomic mismanagement in Japan has redo this by letting the markets rip, untended strained its growth rate for nearly seven by the IMF, which could then be sidelined years now, and Japan is still a net lender of or even disbanded. Liberals would do it capital. But it is a non sequitur to suggest, instead by turning the IMF into the world's as the defenders of free capital mobility do, lender of last resort, dispensing funds dur-that this possibility somehow negates the ing crises with several sorts of conditions, fact that short-term borrowings under free and overseeing, buttressing, and managing capital mobility will be, and have been, a the world of free capital mobility.
To understand why neither of these modifications is enough, it is necessary to understand why the original version of source of considerable economic difficulty.
DOWNSIZING GAINS
When a crisis hits, the downside of fi?ee the myth, which has steadily propelled capital mobility arises. To ensure that capithe IMF into its complacent and dangerous tai retums, the country must do everything moves toward the goal of capital account it can to restore the confidence of those convertibility, was just that. True, econ-who have taken their money out. This typiomists properly say that there is a correcally means raising interest rates, as the IMF spondence between free trade in goods has required of Indonesia. Across Asia this
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has decimated firms with large amounts of debt. It also means having to sell domestic assets, which are gready undervalued because ofthe credit crunch, in a fire sale to foreign buyers with better access to fijnds.
(Economists have usually advised the exact opposite in such depressed circumstances: restricting foreign access to a country's assets when its credit, but not that of others, has dried up.) Thus, Thailand and South Korea have been forced to further open their capital markets, even though the short-term capital inflow played a principal role in their troubles in the first place. Besides suffering these economic setbacks, these countries have lost the political independence to run their economic policies as they deem fit. That their independence is lost not directly to foreign nations but to an IMF increasingly extending its agenda, at the behest ofthe U.S. Congress, to invade domestic policies on matters of social policy-as with the 1994 Sanders-Frank Amendment, which seeks to attach labor standards conditions to any increase in bailout funds-is small consolation indeed.
Thus, any nation contemplating the embrace of free capital mobility must reckon with these costs and also consider the probability of running into a crisis. The gains from economic efficiency that would flow from free capital mobihty, in a hypothetical crisis-free world, must be set against this loss if a wise decision is to be made.
None ofthe proponents of free capital mobility have estimated the size ofthe gains they expect to materialize, even leaving out the losses from crises that can ensue. For free trade, numerous studies have measured the costs of protection. The overwhelming majority of trade economists judge the gains from free FOREIGN May/June 1998 [9] trade to be significant, coming down have registered remarkable growth rates somewhere between Paul Krugman's view without capital account convertibiht)'. that they are too small to be taken seriously Western Europe's return to prosperity and Jeffrey Sachs' view that they are huge was also achieved without capital account and cannot be ignored. But all we have convertibility. Except for Switzerland, from the proponents of capital mobility is capital account liberalization was pretty banner-waving, such as that of Bradford slow at the outset and did not gain strength De Long, the Berkeley economist and for-until the late 1980s, and some European mer deputy assistant secretary for economic countries, among them Portugal and policy in the Clinton administration:
So now we have all the benefits of free flows of international capital. These benefits are mammoth: the ability to borrow abroad kept the Reagan deficits from crushing U.S. growth like an egg, and the ability to borrow from abroad has enabled successful emerging market economies to double or triple the speed at which their productivity levels and living standards converge to the industrial core.
And of Roger C. Altman, the investment banker, who served in the Treasury Department under Presidents Clinton and Carter:
The worldwide elimination of barriers to trade and capital... have created the global fmancial marketplace, which informed observers hailed for bringing private capital to the developing world, encouraging economic growth and democracy.T hese assertions assume that free capital mobility is enormously beneficial while simultaneously failing to evaluate its crisis-prone downside. But even a cursory glance at history suggests that these gains may be negligible. After all, China and Japan, different in politics and Ireland, did not implement it until the early 1990s.
Besides, even if one believes that capital fiows are greatly productive, there is stili an important difference between embracing free portfolio capital mobility and having a policy of attracting direct equity investment. Maybe the amount of direct foreign investment that a country attracts will be reduced somewhat by not having freedom of portfolio capital flows, but there is little evidence for tbis assertion. Even then such a loss would be a small fraction ofthe gains from having a pro-foreign investment strategy.
A WALL STREET-TREASURY COMPLEX
That brings us to the myth that crises under capital account convertibility can be ehminated. We have, of course, heard this assertion before as each crisis has been confronted, and then we have been hit by yet another one. Like cats, crises have many lives, and macroeconomists, never a tribe that enjoyed a great reputation for getting things right or for agreeing among themselves, have been kept busy adding to the taxonomy of crises and their explanations. None of sociology as well as historical experience, the solutions currently propounded can Bradford De Long, "What's Wrong with Our Bloody Economies?" January u, 1998, from his World Wide Web page, http://ecom6i.berkeley.edu/; Roger C. Altman, "The Nuke ofthe 90's," The New York Times Magazine, March 1,1998, p. 34.
[10] FOREIGN AFFAIRS VolumejjNo.
really rid the system of free capital sectors and countries. This is indeed all to mobility of instability. the good and promises worldwide prosThus, while no one can disagree with perity. But this wave has also lulled many Secretary ofthe Treasury Robert Rubin's economists and policymakers into comcontetition that reform of banking systems placency about the pitfalls that certain around the world will help, few should markets inherently pose even when they agree with him that it will eliminate the were understood in the classroom. Free crises that unregulated capital flows inher-capital mobility is just one example of this ently generate. Nor can the abolition ofthe unwarranted attitude. Indeed, Stanley IMF and its lender of last resort bailouts be Fischer, the deputy managing director of the magic bullet: there were crises before the IMF, admitted in a February appearance the writer Walter Bagehot invented this on the Charlie Rose show on PBS that he ftinction for domestic central banks in the had underestimated the probability of such nineteenth century. Nor can making the crises arising in a world of capital mobility. IMF more powerful kill the crises or give it But interests have also played a central the nonexistent macroeconomic msdom to role. Wall Street s financial firms have obvimanage them at least cost when they arise, ous self-interest in a world of free capital
In short, when we penetrate the fog mobility since it only enlarges the arena in of implausible assertions that surrounds which to make money. It is not surprising, the case for free capital mobility, we realize therefore, that Wall Street has put its powthat the idea and the ideology of free erful oar into the turbulent waters of Washtrade and its benefits-and this extends ington political lobbying to steer in this to the continuing liberalization of trade direction. Thus, when testifying before the in goods and financial and other services Senate Foreign Relations Committee on at the World Trade Organization-have. South Asia in March 1995, right after the in effect, been hijacked by the proponents Mexican peso crisis, I was witness to the of capital mobility. They have been used grilling of Undersecretary of Commerce to batnboozle us into celebrating the new Jeffrey E. Garten on why Indias financial world of trillions of dollars moving about system was not fully open to U.S. firms, daily in a borderless world, creating gigan-To his credit, Garten said that this was not tic economic gains, rewarding virtue and exactly a propitious time for the United punishing profligacy. The pretty face
States to pressure India in this direction, presented to us is, in fact, a mask that Then again. Wall Street has exceptional hides the warts and wrinkles underneath, clout with Washington for the simple The question, then, is why the world reason that there is, in the sense ofa power has nonetheless been moving in this direc-elite a la C. Wright Mills, a definite nettion. The answer, as always, reflects ideol-working of hke-minded luminaries ogy and interests-that is, lobbies. The among the powerful institutions-^Wall ideology is clearly that of markets. The Street, the Treasury Department, the steady move away fi-om central planning.
State This powerful network, which may aptly, if loosely, be called the Wall Street^Treasury complex, is unable to look much beyond the interest of Wall Street, which it equates with the good ofthe world. Thus the IMF has been relentlessly propelled toward embracing the goal of capital account convertibility. The Mexican bailout of 1994 was presented as necessary, which was true. But so too was the flip side, that the Wall Street investors had to be bailed out as well, which was not. Surely other policy instrumetits, such as a surcharge, could have been deployed simultaneously to punish Wall Street for its mistakes. Even in the current Asian crisis, particularly in South Korea, U.S. banks could all have been forced to the bargaining table, absorbing far larger losses than they did, but they were cushioned by the IMF acting virtually as a lender of first, rather than last, resort.
And despite the evidence of the inherent risks of free capital flows, the Wall Street-Treasury complex is currently proceeding on the self-serving assumption that the ideal world is indeed one of firee capital fiows, vnth the IMF and its bailouts at the apex in a role that guarantees its survival and enhances its status. But the weight of evidence and the force of logic point in the opposite direction, tovrard restraints on capital flows. It is time to shift the burden of proof fi-om those who oppose to those who favor liberated capital.^F 
